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CRIMINAL LAW-CONNECTICUT ADOPTS COMPREHENSIVE COM­
PUTER CRIME LEGISLATION: PUBLIC ACT 84-206 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 31, 1984, Connecticut Governor William O'Neill signed 
into law a comprehensive computer crimes statute.! The successful 
passage of the legislation largely resulted from a growing awareness in 
the legislature of the vulnerability of computer systems to criminal 
manipulation and destruction. 2 The business and legal communities 
were instrumental in bringing the scope of the problem to the atten­
tion of state legislators. 3 This article will examine the Connecticut 
statute4 and evaluate the extent to which the legislation is needed in its 
present form. 5 
II. THE STATUTE'S PROVISIONS 
Generally, the act (1) establishes a definitional framework;6 (2) 
delineates five separate computer crimes;7 (3) prescribes penalties;8 (4) 
1. Act of May 31, 1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Legis. Serv. 193 (West). 
Connecticut's computer crime statute became effective on October I, 1984. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 2-32 (1983)(effective date of public and special acts). 
2. Experts estimate that computer crime losses in the United States alone range from 
$100 million to $10 billion annually. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A 
HANDBOOK ON WHITE CoLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss 6 
(1974); J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW, 264 (1983). But see Taber, A 
Survey of Computer Crime Studies, 2 CoMPUTER/L. J. 275 (1980). Taber maintains that 
"'computer crime' is insignificant." J.d. at 310. He argues that the above cited figures are 
unverified and invalid and further that legislators have acted hastily in justifying a need for 
computer crime legislation on "inadequate research." [d. at 310-11. 
3. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. For the past decade the problems asso­
ciated with computer crimes have been the subject of increasing discourse among legisla­
tors, computer experts, and the bar throughout the United States. See D. PARKER, CRIME 
BY CoMPUTER (1976), and Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, 5 
RUTGERS 1. CoMPUTERS & L. 271 (1976) for early works by two of the most prominent 
experts in the field. See also A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME (1978). Their discourse drew 
widespread attention in Connecticut only within the past two years. See infra notes 54-60 
and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 6-53 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 54-93 and accompanying text. This article attempts to define as 
narrowly as possible the intent of the drafters of Connecticut's computer crime legislation. 
6. Act of May 31,1984, § I, supra note I, at 193-94. See infra notes 16-24 and ac­
companying text. 
7. Act of May 31, 1984, § 2, supra note I, at 194-95. See infra notes 25-37 and ac­
companying text. 
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authorizes civil actions;9 and (5) addresses procedural matters that af­
fect the application of the statute. IO 
Most of the drafters of Connecticut's statute assert that Public 
Act 84-206 represents a unique approach to computer crime legisla­
tion. 11 Generally, their claim is justified. A majority of the states that 
have adopted computer crime legislationl2 modeled their statutes after 
proposed federal legislation. 13 These versions have been widely criti­
cized as being too broad and too harsh. 14 In both form and substance, 
however, the Connecticut statute parallels very closely a sister state's 
immediately preceding legislation-Delaware's computer crime 
statute. IS 
A. Definitions 
The Connecticut computer crimes statute attempts to define the 
medium of the crime as well as the terms that the legislature expected 
8. Act of May 31, 1984, §§ 3-9, supra note 1, at 195-96. See infra notes 38-44 and 
accompanying text. 
9. Act of May 31, 1984, § 13, supra note 1, at 197-98. See infra notes 45-48 and 
accompanying text. 
10. Act of May 31, 1984, §§ 10-12, 13(g), 13(h), infra note 1, at 196-98. See infra 
notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
11. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Com­
mittee on Computer Crimes, Assoc. Partner of Cummings & Lockwood, Stamford, Conn. 
(Sept. 20, 1984). The drafters reviewed the legislation of at least 16 states that had already 
adopted computer crime legislation as well as proposed federal legislation before they be­
gan to frame the Connecticut draft. Id. 
12. State statutes modeled after proposed federal legislation include: ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-2316 (1978); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 502 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.Q1 to -.07 (West Supp. 
1985); Act of Sept. 11, 1979, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984­
1985); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 752.792 to -.797 (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 30-16A-l to -4 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -457 (1983); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 11-52-1 to -5 (1981 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to -704 (Supp. 
1983); VA. CoDE § 18.2-152.1 to -.14 (Supp. 1984). 
13. See S. 1766, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONGo REC. 796 (1978); Federal Computer 
Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm on Crim Laws and Proc. 
ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), and S. 240, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess., 125 CONGo REC. 1190-91 (1979); Computer Systems Protection Act of1979: Hear­
ings on S. 240 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Neither bill was enacted. See also Krieger, Current and Pr0­
posed Computer Crime Legislation, 2 COMPUTER/L. 1. 721, 725-26 (1980)(reprints of pro­
posed federal legislation). 
14. Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681, 708-09 
(1980); Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 COMPUTER L. 1. 517, 523-37 
(1979). 
15. Compare Act of May 31, 1984, supra note 1 with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 931-39 (Supp. 1984). 
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would arise in the ordinary course of prosecution under the statute. 16 
The definitional section is the only portion of the statute that reveals 
strong positive influence by the provisions of other jurisdictionsY 
Negative influence is prominent as well. For instance, a number of 
jurisdictions that have considered computer crime legislation, includ­
ing the federal government, have provided for definitional exclusions 
which limit the breadth of the legislation. IS Drafters in Connecticut, 
as in a majority of states,19 chose not to provide for limiting exclu­
sions since further technological advances might make some exclu­
sions obsolete.20 
Assuming the drafters in Connecticut feared premature obsoles­
cence, their definition of "computer" as an "electronic device"21 is 
perplexing. Other state legislatures have exhibited greater consistency 
regarding the fear of obsolescence by including all known computer 
technologies in their definitions of "computer."22 As one commenta­
tor noted, states that provide only for electronic devices may run into 
problems since "many computers of the future may not be electrical at 
all."23 With computer technology advancing as rapidly as it has, 
amending Connecticut's definition of "computer" may become neces­
sary sooner than anticipated. 24 
16. Act of May 31, 1984, § 1, supra note 1, at 193-94. Defining "computer crime" 
has not been easy. Even experts have failed to agree on a layman's definition for computer. 
The definition with which experts are in accord is lengthy and far too technical for legal 
use. Taber, supra note 14, at 532 n.88. 
17. Compare Act of May 31, 1984, § l,supra note 1, at 193-94 with S. 240, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONGo REc. 1190-91 (l979)(The Computer Systems Protection Act of 
1979 which was never enacted). Compare Act of May 31, 1984, § 1(2), supra note 1, at 193 
with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-702(2) (1983). 
18. For example, the computer crime legislation in one state and proposed federal 
legislation explicitly exclude some personal and household computerized devices from the 
legislation's coverage. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.73.1-.5 (West Supp. 1985); Krieger, 
supra note 13, at 725-26 (discussing proposed federal legislation). 
19. All states but Louisiana. Compare Louisiana statute supra note 18 with those 
listed at infra note 89. 
20. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note 11. 
21. Act of May 31, 1984, § l(a)(2), supra note 1, at 193. 
22. For example, Pennsylvania's computer crime statute defines "computer" in part 
as "[a]n electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic, organic or other high speed data process­
ing device or system ...." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933(c) (purdon Supp. 1984­
1985)(emphasis added). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(2) (1981)("an internally 
programmed, automatic device"). 
23. Gemignani, supra note 14, at 681 n.3. 
24. The chairperson ofthe ad hoc committee, Linda O. Smiddy, contends that even a 
state such as Pennsylvania will eventually run into problems since drafters cannot possibly 
foresee every technological advance. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra 
note 11. The fact is, however, that some of the forms of computers listed in the Penn­
sylvania statute, 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) are existing 
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B. Crimes 
The Connecticut statute establishes five categories of computer 
crimes: (1) unauthorized access; (2) theft of computer services; (3) 
disruption of computer services; (4) misuse of computer system infor­
mation; and (5) destruction of computer equipment.2s The legislature 
intended the five criminal provisions to be interpreted libera11y.26 
Moreover, the provisions indicate that a computer system and not 
merely a computer is the object of the crime.27 The distinction is sig­
nificant since "computer system" includes more definitiona11y than 
"computer."28 
In the process of proscribing certain computer-related activities, 
the drafters meant to create categories or levels of crime rather than 
specific crimes defined by example.29 Arguably, an operative premise 
to the crimes section can be inferred from the statute's history and 
wording. The premise presupposes that all computer crime in its 
purest conceptual form represents an intentional disregard of a given 
scope of authorization.30 One is not guilty of computer crime, that is, 
or emerging technologies, See Federal Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S. 
1766 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Proc..ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978) (testimony of D. Parker), and today's legislators must ad­
dress them. Moreover, Pennsylvania's statute contains a catch all phrase ("or other") to 
obviate the potential need for future amendment. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3933(c). But 
cf Interim Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary of the State of Connecticut 
473 (Dec. 5, 1983) (remarks demonstrating an awareness of rapid technological advance­
ment and a desire to draft a bill reflecting that understanding) [hereinafter cited as Interim 
Proceedings]. 
25. Act of May 31, 1984, § 2, supra note I, at 194-95. A sixth but conceptually 
different crime exists in the event that one "recklessly engages in conduct which creates a 
risk of serious physical injury to another person" during the execution of any of the five 
enumerated categories of crime. Id. § 5(a)(2), supra note I, at 195. 
26. Telephone interview with Howard T. Owens, Jr., Conn. state senator since 1975, 
Co-chairman of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, and senior partner of Owens & 
Schine, Bridgeport, Conn. (Sept. 25, 1984). See also, Interim Proceedings, supra note 24, at 
467,477 (chairperson Smiddy's views as to how the committee dealt with the elusive nature 
of computer crimes). 
27. Act of May 31, 1984, § 2, supra note I, at 194-95. 
28. "'Computer system' means a computer, its software, related equipment, commu­
nications facilities, if any, and includes computer networks." Id. § l(a)(7), supra note I, at 
193-94. 
29. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note 11. See also, Interim 
Proceedings, supra note 24, at 470-71 (remarks of Mr. Post suggesting criminal categories 
of computer crime). 
30. One commentator defines computer crime as "the use of the computer or its 
technology as a target of or a tool for illegal purposes." SoMA, supra note 2, at 265. While 
the functional distinction among computer crimes in Connecticut rests on scope of authori­
zation, see Act of May 31, 1984, § 2, supra note I, at 194-95, the legislature apparently 
intended that one would not be "authorized" to do an illegal act. 
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one does not meet the threshhold of a criminal category, without first 

exceeding the bounds of his authorization.31 Thus, each level of crime, 

. from section 2(a) to 2(f), contemplates the existence of broader and 

broader user authority.32 This is a rational scheme for delineating 

among categories of computer crime as it is readily comprehendible to 

the layman. 
Unfortunately, the statutory wording in section two is ambigu­
OUS. 33 The first crime, unauthorized access,34 definitely requires scien­
ter;35 that is, individuals must have known or reasonably should have 
known that they had no authorization to access a computer. The stat­
ute expressly provides the accused with an affirmative defense: if he/ 
she can show a lack of scienter, he/she will avoid conviction.36 In the 
remaining crimes, however, the requirement of scienter is arguably 
unclear. 37 
The second crime, for instance, requires an "intent to obtain un­
authorized computer services."38 The lack of an express affirmative 
defense for those accused of the second crime, or any of the remaining 
crimes for that matter, makes the requirement of scienter questionable. 
What if the defendant accessed and obtained a service believing he/she 
had authorization to do so when, in fact, he/she did not? Did the 
drafters mean for intent to be read into the word "unauthorized"? If 
so, then a conviction in the hypothetical should fail for a lack of in­
tent. If, however, the word "unauthorized" is not an aspect of intent 
but merely modifies "computer services," then the conviction would 
succeed since the defendant's knowledge of the service's status would 
be irrelevant. As long as he/she accessed the service-whether he/ 
she knew he/she was allowed to or not-and it was hislher purpose to 
do so, the criminal elements will have been established. 
31. See L. Smiddy & J. Smiddy, Connecticut's New Computer Crime Law, Conn. L. 
Tribune, Nov. 19, 1984, at 1,6, co1.2 (passage implying the scope of authorization premise). 
For example, an individual may be authorized to access a computer while unauthorized to 
access certain services provided by the system. An individual with greater authority may 
be authorized to use all of a system's services and programs, but not to alter data or remove 
computer equipment. The widest scope of authority applies to those individuals with main­
tenance authority of the computer system such that they may delete data or, perhaps, re­
move equipment from the system. Id. 
32. See Act of May 31, 1984, §§ 2(a)-(f), supra note I, at 194-95. 
33. Id. § 2, supra note I, at 194-95. 
34. Id. § 2(b)(I), supra note I, at 194. 
35. Defined herein as guilty know/edge. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (rev. 5th 
ed. 1979). 
36. Act of May 31, 1984, § 2(b), supra note I, at 194. 
37. Id. §§ 2(c)-(f), supra note I, at 194-95. 
38. Id. § 2(c), supra note I, at 194. 
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The crucial issue not clearly addressed by the drafters, therefore, 
is a distinction between wrongful intent and a mere intent to act, scien­
ter not being an inherent element of the latter.39 
C. Penalties 
The drafters largely patterned the penalties provisions after Con­
necticut's larceny statute.4O For the purpose of penalization, six crimi­
nal classifications exist within the larceny statute: three orders of 
felonies and three orders of misdemeanors.41 The computer crime 
statute has been subdivided into similar classifications delineated by 
similar criteria.42 The value of the damage or of the misappropriated 
service determines the gravity of the crime.43 Punishment is by fine or 
imprisonment or both.44 For valuation, the statute stipulates that 
39. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "[a]n act is always a voluntary 
muscular contraction, and nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which it sets in 
motion or directs to the plaintiff's harm is no part of it." O. W. HOLMES, THE CoMMON 
LAW 91 (1938). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that one cannot 
presume a wrongful intent from an act itself. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 
(1952). In Morissette, the defendant had taken metal bombshell casings from government 
land thinking that since they had been there for four years they had been abandoned. The 
government brought an action for criminal conversion, and the court noted: 
That the removal of [the casings] was a conscious and intentional act was admit­
ted. But that isolated fact is not an adequate basis on which the jury should find 
the criminal intent to steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive 
another of possession of property. 
[d. at 276. Thus, in the hypothetical mentioned in the text, it would not be fair to presume 
criminal intent from the accused's use of a service later learned to be unauthorized. 
40. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note II. Compare Act of May 
31, 1984, §§ 3-7, supra note I, at 195-96 with CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-122 to -125(b) 
(1983). 
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-122 to -125(b) (1983). 
42. Only five classes of computer crime exisi: computer crimes in the first to the fifth 
degree correspond to similar classes of crime as provided in the larceny statute, see CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-122 to -125(b) (1983). 
43. 
COMPUTER CRIME CRIME CLASS VALUATION OF 
DAMAGE 
(determines criminal class) 
1st Degree Class B Felony exceeds $10,000 
2nd Degree Class C Felony exceeds $ 5,000 
3rd Degree Class D Felony exceeds $ 1,000 
4th Degree Class A Misdemeanor exceeds $ 500 
5th Degree Class B Misdemeanor $500 or less 
Act of May 31, 1984, §§ 3-7, supra note I, at 195-96. 
44. Corresponding penalties for each criminal class are as follows: 
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market value at the time of the violation shall be the measuring stick.45 
When market values are not ascertainable the statute provides gap­
filler valuations.46 
D. Civil Actions and Other Provisions 
The Connecticut statute is one of only two state statutes to ex­
pressly allow civil actions arising out of computer crimes.47 Moreover, 
the statute authorizes any "aggrieved person" who has reason to sus­
pect that someone has engaged, is engaging, or will engage in a com­
puter crime to file a lawsuit against the suspected offender.48 In 
addition to seeking actual damages,49 the aggrieved person may also 
seek (1) an injunction to restrain the accused from engaging in the act; 
COMPUTER IMPRISONMENT FINES 
CRIME (discretionary) (discretionary) 
Class B Felony 1 to 20 years not to exceed $10,000 
Class C Felony 1 to 10 years not to exceed $5,000 
Class D Felony 1 to 5 years not to exceed $5,000 
Class A Misdemeanor up to 1 year not to exceed $1,000 
Class B Misdemeanor u~ to 6 months not to exceed $1,000 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-35(a), 53a-35(b), 53a-36(1), 53a-36(2), 53a-41, 53a-42 (1983). 
If persons gain money, property, services, or other items of value as a result of their 
activities, however, the court may fine them up to twice the amount of their aggregate gain 
instead of imposing the statutorily mandated fine and order incarceration. Id. § 53a-44. 
The decision rests within the judge's discretion. Act of May 31,1984, § 8, supra note I, at 
196. 
Where individuals have been found guilty of more than one section 2 violation, more­
over, the damages assessed against them for each violation may be aggregated to determine 
the classification of their crimes. Id. § 9, supra note I, at 196. For example, if an individual 
illegally procures and sells a program worth $900 in one instance and then illegally destroys 
a $4,500 terminal in another, a conviction of computer crime in the second degree may 
follow since the assessed damages of each violation aggregate to an amount exceeding 
$5,000. If the amounts of each violation were not aggregated, he/she would be guilty of 
computer crimes in the fourth and third degrees, respectively. 
45. Act of May 31, 1984, § 100a), supra note I, at 196. 
46. Id. §§ 1O(b), 100c), supra note I, at 196. 
47. Id. § 13, supra note I, at 197-98. Only Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. ll, 
§§ 931-39 (Supp. 1984), and Connecticut have passed comprehensive computer crime leg­
islation that expressly authorizes the filing of civil actions. The Illinois and South Dakota 
statutes merely provide that computer crime legislation does not affect rights to civil ac­
tion. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-9(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 43-43B-7 (1983). In Connecticut, moreover, criminal prosecution is not a 
prerequisite to the filing ofa civil action. Act of May 31,1984, § 13(f), supra note I, at 198. 
48. Act of May 31, 1984, § 13(a), supra note I, at 197-98 . 
. 49. A person who sutfers injury to person, property, or business may sue to recover 
actual damages which may include nonpecuniary damages such as emotional distress. 
Where malicious or wilful conduct can be shown, the injured party may recover treble 
damages. Moreover, the prevailing plaintitf will recover costs and attorney's fees. Id. 
§ 13(c)-13(e). 
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(2) an order directing restitution; or (3) an order directing the appoint­
ment of a receiver. so 
Other provisions within the statute are also unique. For example, 
it waives sovereign immunity.sl The impetus for the statute's signifi­
cant waiver arose from the legislators' concern of protecting privacy.S2 
The statute also provides for a broad grant of jurisdiction to Connecti­
cut courts, S3 judicial authority to determine proper venue, S4 and a 
three-year statute of limitations.ss 
III. THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION 
. A. Background 
Legislators had first attempted to bring computer crime legisla­
tion to Connecticut in 1980. In that year the Joint Committee of the 
judiciary introduced a house bill containing comprehensive computer 
crime legislation. S6 Richard Tulisano, one of the sponsors of the bill, 
admits that the Committee introduced the measure to educate Con­
necticut legislators about the e~istence of a real and potentially threat­
ening problem. S7 Yet, the bill had no foundation of interest or 
awareness in Connecticut. Few interest groups, if any, had lobbied for 
such legislation. S8 As a result, most legislators treated the bill with 
50. Id. §§ 13(a)(I) to 13(a)(3), supra note 1, at 197-98. 
51. Id. § 13(g), supra note 1, at 198. An amendment to the original house bill, H.B. 
5041, 1984 Sess., included the waiver of sovereign immunity. "The substance of [the] 
amendment was originally intended to be included in the bill, but was not through some 
oversight." Conn. H. R. Proc., p. 1998 (April 18, 1984). 
52. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, Conn. state representative and 
Co-chairman of the Joint Committee of the JUdiciary, Hartford, Conn. (Sept. 28, 1984). 
The act protects private personal data from any unauthorized intrusion by either a private 
individual or the government. 
Private personal data is data concerning a natural person which a reasonable per­
son would want to keep private and which is protectable under law. Not all infor­
mation about an individual is automatically protected. There must be some 
common law or statutory basis for protection other than [this act]. 
Smiddy and Smiddy, supra note 31, at 6, col. 3. For concerns relating to the protection of 
private information stored in computer systems, see Comment, The Use and Abuse o/Com­
puterized In/ormation: Striking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organiza­
tional In/ormation Needs, 44 ALB. L. REv. 589 (1980). 
53. Act of May 31, 1984, § 11, supra note 1, at 197. 
54. Id. § 12, supra note 1, at 197. 
55. Id. § 13(h), supra note 1, at 198. The statute of limitations begins to run at the 
time the alleged violation is or should have been discovered. Id. 
56. H.B. 6034, 1980 Sess., Conn. (introduced on March 20, 1980). 
57. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. 
58. Id. Connecticut only slowly became aware of the problem for a number of rea­
sons. Evidence later revealed in committee hearings shows that the business community 
had been aware of the computer abuse problem for quite some time but had never been 
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indifference and suspected it dealt with an insignificant problem. Not 
surprisingly, the bill died in committee. 59 
A subsequent increase in the number of complaints from business 
and industry concerning several forms of computer fraud and abuse 
signaled a growth of awareness of computer crime in Connecticut.60 
Once aware of and threatened by the problem, business, legal, and 
government interests began lobbying for legislative protection. 61 By 
September, 1983, former state senator Russell Post had formed an ad 
hoc committee62 to research computer crime in Connecticut and, fur­
ther, to draft legislation to meet the problem.63 
B. The Inadequacy ofExisting Law 
The ad hoc committee looked to existing criminal law first to de­
termine whether Connecticut needed additional legislation. The ad 
hoc committee and many legislators reached a consensus that existing 
Connecticut law inadequately provided for the prosecution of many 
computer crimes. 64 
vocal about it. Interim Proceedings, supra note 24, at 456; SoMA, supra note 2, at 269. For 
much of the business community, the problem is a sensitive one since breaches of a firm's 
computer security system reflect on that firm's integrity. Reporting the breaches would 
create an image of instability. Id. at 269-70; Volgyes, The Investigation, Prosecution, and 
Prevention 0/ Computer Crime: A State-of-the-Art Review, 2 CoMPUTER/L. J. 385, 394 
(1980). 
59. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. The technological 
complexity of the issues involved tends to intimidate lawmakers as well as members of the 
judiciary, many of whom have no formal education in computer technology. Gemignani, 
supra note 14, at 686. 
60. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. For several years, 
the Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA) received several state-wide 
reports decsribing instances of theft and interruption of services; destruction of computer 
equipment; destruction or alteration of software; unauthorized access; embezzlement; 
fraud; and disclosure of confidential information. Interim Proceedings, supra note 24, at 
456-57. Experts note that the number of computer crimes has been increasing. Each in­
stance of computer crime results, on the average, in a $450,000 loss, D. PARKER, FIGHTING 
COMPUTER CRIME 25 (1983), a significant loss for even the largest corporation. 
61. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. See also Interim 
Proceedings, supra note 24, at 453-54. 
62. Telephone interview with Howard T. Owens, supra note 26; Interim Proceedings, 
supra note 24, at 455-57. Representation on the ad hoc committee included the business 
and the financial communities (New England Telephone, Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, General Electric, Perkin-Elmer, IBM, Connecticut Bank & Trust, United Tech­
nologies, and the CBIA) and the legal and governmental communities (Cummings & Lock­
wood, the Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, and former U.S. Attorney Richard 
Blumenthal). Id. at 453-54. 
63. Telephone interview with Howard T. Owens, supra note 26. 
64. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note II. See also N.Y. Times, 
Sept 18, 1983, at AI, col. 1. But see SoMA, supra note 2, at 263 n.8 (views of John Taber 
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Before computer crime legislation existed, governments prose­
cuted computer crimes under traditional common law or statutory 
crimes, such as larceny,6S theft of services,66 and theft of trade 
secrets.67 One commentator suggested the use of other established 
criminal provisions including credit card fraud, burglary, telephone 
abuse, and criminal mischief.68 Since most of these crimes69 evolved 
long before the advent of the computer, they fail to take into account 
novel forms of property and other characteristics peculiar to computer 
crime.70 In some states, for example, property subject to larceny must 
be a tangible article.7! Moreover, the taking or asportation72 of the 
article must permanently or significantly deprive the owner of the use 
. of the object. 73 
In Lund v. Commonwealth,74 for instance, a graduate student 
gained the use of a school computer system by fraudulently entering 
the access numbers of other registered users. He used more than 
$26,000 worth of unauthorized computer time.7S The jury found the 
student guilty of grand larceny. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction holding that the theft of computer time 
that existing criminal law is adequate); Comment, Legislative Issues in Computer Crime, 21 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 241-42 (1984)(existing criminal law adequate). 
65. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977). 
66. State v McGraw, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App., 2d Dist. 1984). 
67. Ward v. Superior Court of California, 3 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 206 
(Cal Super. Ct. 1972)(mem.). 
68. Nycum, supra note 3, at 285-93. 
69. A key controversy in the debate on the structure of computer crime legislation 
concerns whether crimes by computer involve traditional crimes perpetrated by new 
means, or whether they are entirely new forms of crime. "The preponderance of opinion 
. . . supports the view that the computer has changed both the form and means by which 
the traditional crimes ... are created." Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deter­
rent Legislation, 2 CoMPUTER L. J. 353,362 (1980). 
70. Smiddy & Smiddy, supra note 31, at 1, col.l. Connecticut statutes on point in­
clude CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119(7) (1983)(theft of services); id. § 31-4On (1983)(theft of 
trade secrets applying only to information concerning toxic SUbstances); id. §§ 53a-128a to 
-128i (1983)(credit card crimes); id. §§ 53a-l00 to -104 (1983)(burglary applying only 
where a building is physically entered); id. §§ 53a-187 to -188 (1983)(telephone abuse); id. 
§§ 53a-1l5 to -1l7 (l983)(criminal mischief applying only to a tampering with tangible 
property). 
71. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-1l8 (1983); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 708-800(15) 
(1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). 
72. See infra note 84. 
73. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119 (1983); see also SOMA, supra note 2, at 274-75 
(discussion of the significance of asportation in Ward V. Superior Court of California, 3 
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972». 
74. 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977). 
75. Id at 690, 232 S.E.2d at 747. 
1985] CONNECTICUT LEGISLATION 817 

did not constitute larceny under the Virginia Code.76 Other statutes 
would almost certainly fail because of similar limitations. 77 
Conversely, courts in some states have interpreted existing stat­
utes broadly so as to include computer crimes. 78 Yet, little uniformity 
can be expected when the application of a statute turns on the philoso­
phy of an individuaP9 Only new legislation can remedy the various 
inadequacies of traditonallaws. 
C. Alternatives 
1. Redefining the Law 
Some commentators intimate that many of the problems associ­
ated with the prosecution of computer crime under traditional laws 
could be solved by legislatively expanding traditional criminal con­
cepts. 80 The approach calls for the redefinition of terms such as 
"property" and "theft of services" so as to encompass crimes commit­
ted with the aid of computers.8I Still, in some states where older con­
cepts have been expanded,82 whether the "new" statutes will be 
76. Id. at 691-92, 232 S.E.2d at 748. Maryland and Florida used a tangibility test 
similar to the one employed by Virginia courts with respect to property in larceny statutes. 
Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). Delaware and New Jersey also used a 
tangibility test. Nycum, supra note 3, at 281,284. See also Comment, Computer Crime­
Senate Bi// S. 240, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 660, 663-64 (1980). 
77. Connecticut's burglary statute, for example, requires an entering of the premises. 
See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-101 (1983). 
78. See, e.g., State v. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App., 2d Dist. 1984); see also 
U.S. v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 
(1979)(describing unauthorized computer usage as a trespass upon physical property). 
79. As a result of the SUbjectivity inherent in the "intrinsic values" of ideas, judges 
may act out of moral or political convictions. See P. SAYRE, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 10-12 
(1981). Moreover, while precedent binds judges, they are "under no obligation to follow 
any particular precedent." L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 32 (1979). Judges exploit what 
Dr. Lief Carter, an eminent commentator, calls "fact freedom" to decide which facts in the 
case before them are material thereby making their choice of which precedent to follow 
somewhat discretionary. Id. Conceivably, possibly inevitably, judges will be guided by 
their own moral or political philosophy in making their choices. Two factually similar 
cases, therefore, though governed by the same statute, may well have inconsistent outcomes 
where the judges espouse different personal philosophies. 
80. Comment, supra note 64, at 241-42; see id. at 254 (traditional concepts obselete). 
81. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(1O) (1982)(defining property as "[a]ny money, 
[or] tangible or intangible personal property"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(6)(B) 
(Vernon Supp. 1984)(property means "tangible or intangible personal property ..."); 
§ 31.01(7)(B) (for purposes of theft of services any telecommunication is subject to theft). 
82. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(1O) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.012 (West 
Supp. 1984); GA. CODE § 16-1-3(13) (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-23 (West Supp. 
1984-1985); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 702-14 (West 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, 
§ 352 (1983); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 34O(h) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, 
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sufficient for prosecution of computer crimes has not yet been estab­
lished.83 More specifically, the Connecticut ad hoc committee con­
fronted as a major concern whether simply redefining the law would 
criminalize such activities as unauthorized access of a computer and 
computer services, especially when the wrongdoer memorizes rather 
than copies the accessed data.84 Although some states have redefined 
their theft of services statutes,85 even they might not cover the unau­
thorized access of computers. 86 
2. Comprehensive Computer Crime Legislation 
While the redefinition of certain crimes would be sufficient for the 
prosecution of the more serious computer crimes, at least two undesir­
able effects would result. First, the less serious computer crimes 
would still elude prosecution. 87 Second, redefining traditional law 
would create entirely new and serious problems in prosecuting the 
§ 30(2) (West 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-509(5) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(g) 
(West 1982); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2901.01(1)(1) (page Supp. 1983); TEX. PENAL 
CoDE ANN. § 31.01(6) (B) (Vernon SUpp. 1984). 
83. See Nycom, supra note 3, at 284. 
84. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note II. Common law larceny 
requires asportation, or the phsyica1 action of carrying away the object of the theft. W. 
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 631-33 (1972). Recent redefini­
tions of statutory concepts, such as California's trade secret law, continue to require aspor­
tation. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 499c (West 1983). In Ward v. Superior Court of California, 
the defendant walked away with, or asported, a printed paper copy-a physical object. 
Ward v. Superior Court of California, 3 CoMPUTER L. SERVo REP. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. 1972). What if instead of copying the data he had memorized it and walked 
away? Clearly, he would not have been guilty of theft since no asportation would have 
occurred. [d. at 210. He would have merely engaged in the unauthorized access of a com­
puter. California legislators amended § 499c, effective January I, 1984, to address the 
problem. Currently under § 499c, a "person is guilty of theft who. . . steals, takes, carries 
away, or uses without authorization a trade secret." CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b)(I) (West 
SUpp. 1983-1984). Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have eliminated the requirement of 
asportation in their trade secret statutes, although Massachusetts still requires a copying. 
Nycum, supra note 3, at 283. The Connecticut statute also eliminates the element of aspor­
.. tation. Act of May 31, 1984, § 2(e), supra note I, at 194-95. Many states' computer crime 
laws "require the information to be a trade secret (before it will be protected by statute]. 
Connecticut's law, however, will protect all information stored on a computer whether it is 
a trade secret or not." Smiddy and Smiddy, supra note 31, at 6, col.3. 
85. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2 (West SUpp. 1984-1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17A, § 357 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340 G) (1982); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 637:8 (1974 & SUpp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.01 to - .02 (Page Supp. 
1983). 
86. A computer system can serve only a specified number of users at a given time. 
The system cannot be accessed when its services are fully committed. An unauthorized 
access, therefore, even though not beyond the services menu, will prohibit an authorized 
user from gaining access when the system is working to capacity. 
87. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
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traditional crimes. For example, a new definition of larceny that 
lacked the common law element of asportation would be anathema to 
the underlying concept of larceny.88 
In order to address potential uncertainty regarding the scope of 
statutes that merely redefine and to avoid disturbing a criminal sys­
tem that deals fairly well with the more traditional problems, many 
legislators chose the option of establishing a separate body of com­
puter crimes. 89 They thus obviated the need to restructure substan­
tially a traditional and familiar body of criminal law and also focused 
legislative attention on issues related to computer abuse. The greater 
legislative specificity, in tum, yields greater structural stability 
through more predictable judicial interpretation.90 
In addition, with comprehensive statutes, legislators can focus on 
concerns other than defining the crimes. For instance, although a stat­
ute providing for fines and incarceration would punish the wrongdoer, 
it would not make the injured party whole. The committee members, 
accordingly, authorized civil actions so that the injured party could 
obtain redress.91 In those cases where defendants are not judgment­
proof, victims will be able to recover their losses.92 
In short, the drafters of Connecticut's computer crime statute 
sought to do more than provide legislative clarity. Other concerns in­
88. See supra note 81. 
89. Twenty eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted comprehensive 
computer crime legislation: ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.200, .484, .740, .985, .990 (1983); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316 (1978); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 502 (West Supp. 1985); 
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (Supp. 1984); Act of May 31,1984, Pub. Act No. 
84-206, 1984 Conn. Legis. Servo 193 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-39 (Supp. 
1984);D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 22-3801, -3811, -3821, -3823 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 815.01-.Q7 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CoDE §§ 16-9-90 to -95 (1984); IDAHO CoDE §§ 18­
2201 to -2202 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 484.840, .845, .850, .855 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 14.73.1 to -.5 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 752.791 to -.797 
(West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87 to -.89 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 569.093 to -.099 (Vernon 1985); MONT. CoDE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, -6-310 to -311 
(1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-l to -4 (Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14­
453 to -457 (1983); N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 12.1-06.1-01, 12.106.1-08. (Supp. 1983); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1951-56 (West Supp. 1984-1985); PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3933 
(purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-2 to -5 (1983); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS 
ANN. § 43-43B (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1401 to -1406 (Supp. 1984); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to -704 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-152.1 to -152.14 
(Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 
to -505 (1983). 
90. The need for a liberal and more effective judicial and criminal system compels 
the adoption of comprehensive legislation. Comment, supra note 64, at 240-41. 
91. Telephone interview with Linda O. Smiddy, supra note 11. 
92. See Act of May 31, 1984, §§ 13(b), 13(c), supra note 1, at 198. 
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eluded protection of privacy,93 compensation to the injured party,94 
provision for a clear deterrent to a potential wrongdoer,9s and the 
elimination of sovereign immunity.96 The drafters found comprehen­
sive computer crime legislation necessary in order to address all of 
their concerns simultaneously. 
D. Potential Problems 
The greatest single problem inherent in any criminal legislation 
results from the fact that the crime must be detected and reported 
before it can be prosecuted.97 Presently, experts estimate that only 1 
to 15 out of every 100 computer crimes are reported.98 The root of 
the problem lies in the sophistication of computer technology which 
allows wrongdoers to erase every trace of their acts within the very 
algorithm they use to perpetrate the crime.99 While at least one state 
has made reporting computer crimes a legal duty,100 the legislature 
can do little to overcome this very significant problem. 
Moreover, once the crime is reported, attempts to prosecute may 
be stymied by evidentiary problems. In order to prove the criminal 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution must rely on evi­
dence. Yet, current rules of evidence10 I are arguably inadequate for 
the prosecution of a computer crime. 102 The basic issue involves 
whether computer-generated evidence such as a paper printout, reel or 
disk recording, or punched data card will be admissible as an excep­
93. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. 
94. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
95. Telephone interview with Richard F. Tulisano, supra note 52. 
96. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
97. Note, A Suggested Legislative Approach to the Problem of Computer Crime, 38 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1179-80 (1981). 
98. A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME: A TWENTIETH CENTURY CRISIS xiii (1978). 
99. Interim Proceedings, supra note 24, at 477. Known as 'burying a time bomb,' 
the technique completely prevents detection. See Smiddy and Smiddy, supra note 31, at 6, 
col.2. 
100. GA. CoDE § 16-9-95 (1984). 
101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (1983). For a comparison of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence with the Connecticut Law of Evidence, see Tait, The New Federal Rules 
of Evidence: A Summary of Differences Between the Rules and Connecticut Law of Evi­
dence, 9 CONN. L. REV. I (1976). 
102. See generally Johnston, A Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Computer 
Based Evidence, I COMPUTER/L. J. 667 (1979)(reviews methods for overcoming obsolete 
evidence rules, including the grounds upon which to prevent or to allow evidence into 
admission); Singer, Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules ofEvidence as Applied to Com­
puter-Generated Evidence, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 157 (1979)(inadequacy of Fed­
eral Rules of Evidence due largely to the lack of a fundamental understanding of electronic 
data processing on the part of individuals of the legal community). 
821 1985] CONNECTICUT LEGISLA TION 
tion to both the hearsay and best evidence rules. 103 Getting computer­
generated evidence admitted can still be difficult under existing evi­
dence rules. 104 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While businesses may have been reluctant to publicize the breach 
of their computer systems in the past, lOS the increase in the number of 
computer crimes has forced businesses to publicly acknowledge the 
problem and call for protective legislation in order to avoid absorbing 
computer crime related losses. 106 Pressure from business as well as 
legal and governmental circles culminated in the convocation of the ad 
hoc committee in Connecticut. 107 
After examining whether state and federal laws were adequate for 
the prosecution of computer crimes, or more generally, for the protec­
tion of the business community, the ad hoc committee concluded that 
new legislation was needed. 108 Moreover, several other states, having 
already studied the problem within their own jurisdictions, came to 
the same conclusion and adopted computer crime legislation. 109 Some 
had chosen merely to redefine traditional legal concepts, I 10 while 
others had chosen to enact comprehensive computer crime legislation 
which created wholly new criminal actions. I II Connecticut chose the 
latter approach. 
While a prediction of how well the statute will meet the concerns 
103. SOMA, supra note 2, at 288-95; Fiske, White-Collar Crime: A Survey ofLaw, 18 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169, 384-86 (1980). 
104. Comment, supra note 64, at 253; see Fiske, supra note 103, at 384-86 (citing 
trend in favor of admittance as exception to the hearsay and best evidence rules). See also J. 
WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 1001(4)[07] (1983) (contending that computer gen­
erated evidence should be admitted under existing rules); Connery and Levy, Computer 
Evidence in Federal Courts, 84 CoM. L. J. 266 (1979) . (arguing that computer evidence 
should be admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence if the computer is shown to be 
reliable). 
105. See supra note 58. 
106. Each computer crime inflicts an average loss of approximately $450,000. 
PARKER,supra note 61, at 25. While the figure is skewed considerably by more recent, 
though infrequent, instances, Interim Proceedings, supra note 24, at 464, single strikes may 
range into the billions of dollars. PARKER, supra note 3, at 118; see supra notes 59-60 and 
accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra note 89. 
110. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
Ill. See supro note 89 and accompanying text. 
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of the drafters is premature,1I2 the efforts of the drafters and of the 
Connecticut legislators have injected a demonstrably higher degree of 
certainty into Connecticut criminal law. 
William S. Allred 
112. No actions have arisen under the statute since it became effective. See supra 
note l. 
